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Abstract 
We show that short interest predicts future bad news, negative earnings surprises, and 
downward revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. Moreover, short interest is a better 
predictor of changes in firm fundamentals for stocks that are harder to short and short 
sellers appear to have information about these events several months before they become 
public. Most importantly, the well-known cross-sectional relation between short interest 
and future stock returns vanishes after controlling for short sellers’ information about 
future fundamental news. Thus, short sellers contribute in a significant manner to price 
discovery about firm fundamentals. 
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1.  Introduction 
One robust finding in the empirical investments literature is the negative cross-
sectional relation between the level of short interest and future abnormal stock returns. 
Stocks that are heavily shorted have dismally low returns over the following month. This 
suggests that short sellers are informed traders, but it is less clear what kind of information 
motivates their trades. In this paper, we contribute to this literature and shed light on the 
nature of short sellers’ information.  
Anecdotal evidence from professional short sellers provides hints about how short 
sellers become informed. These traders view their role akin to that of corporate “detectives,” 
who seek to uncover and expose problems with publicly traded firms. Famed short seller 
James Chanos of Kynicos Associates illustrated this view in testimony before the US 
Congress: 
Finally, I want to remind you that, despite two hundred years of “bad press” 
on Wall Street, it was those “un-American, unpatriotic” short sellers that did 
so much to uncover the disaster at Enron and at other infamous financial 
disasters during the past decade (Sunbeam, Boston Chicken, etc.). While 
short sellers probably will never be popular on Wall Street, they often are the 
ones wearing the white hats when it comes to looking for and identifying the 
bad guys! James Chanos, Testimony before the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce (February 6, 2002). 
The argument above suggests that short sellers’ trades contain negative information 
about future changes in firm fundamental value.  If limits to arbitrage prevent instantaneous 
stock price adjustments, then short sellers’ unfavorable information on future fundamentals 
represents one plausible explanation for the well-known negative cross-sectional relation 
between short interest and future stock returns.  
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We present novel evidence that short sellers’ positions predict deterioration in future 
firm fundamentals in a way that is consistent with the return predictability relation observed 
in prior studies. Combining short interest data with RavenPack’s dataset of all public news’ 
content analysis during 2000-2010, we show that that short sellers take profitable positions 
in stocks that will experience negative public news in the future.  Likewise, short sellers 
seem to avoid stocks with positive future public news.  Short sellers also correctly anticipate 
the outcome of future earnings surprises and future revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. 
Our results suggest that the cross-sectional relation between short interest and future 
stock returns can be explained, in large part, by the information that short sellers have about 
future changes in firm fundamentals.  Moreover, short interest is a better predictor of 
changes in firm fundamentals for stocks that are harder to short, as predicted by Diamond 
and Verrecchia’s (1987) argument that shorting costs first remove the less informed traders 
from the market. 
We make two important contributions to the literature.  First, we show that short 
sellers are informed about future changes in firm fundamentals. Second, we show that after 
accounting for this information, the well-known predictive relation between short interest 
and future return vanishes.  Thus, short-sellers join the ranks of stock analysts, institutional 
investors, underwriters, auditors, and bank lenders, who have been shown to provide similar 
information-acquiring functions.1 
                                                 
1 For example, underwriter quality has been shown to influence the extent of IPO underpricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; 
Carter and Manaster, 1990), as has the identity of an IPO firm’s auditors (Beatty, 1989). A long literature shows the 
positive effect of bank loan announcements on a firm’s stock price (e.g., Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; James, 1987; 
Lummer and McConnell, 1989), including the finding that announced loans from higher-quality lenders are associated 
with more positive borrower abnormal returns (Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel, 1995). Brennan and Subramanyam 
(1995) report that the equity of firms that are followed by a larger number of investment analysts trade with smaller bid-
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Our findings are important in view of concerns raised by regulators about other – 
potentially more nefarious – consequences of shorting activities. For example, in the midst 
of the 2008 financial crisis, short sellers were regularly suspected to have intentionally 
driven stock prices below their fundamental values. In line with these views, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) temporarily banned the shorting of financial institutions. 
SEC justified the action by claiming that “unbridled short selling is contributing to the 
recent, sudden price declines in the securities of financial institutions unrelated to true price 
valuation” (SEC release 2008-211).2 
Although our results provide strong evidence that short sellers’ trades predict returns 
due to their informativeness about future fundamentals, we cannot completely rule out that 
some short trades are manipulative or that some short sellers have manipulative intentions. 
Indeed, some studies have shown instances in which the trading patterns of some short 
sellers are consistent with a manipulative intent.3  However, our results do suggest that – on 
average – the dominant effect of short positions is to predict, rather than cause, negative 
abnormal stock returns. This is because short positions are informative about value-relevant 
events that are exogenous and cannot be systematically manipulated by traders: news 
releases, earnings surprises, and analyst forecast revisions. 
Our paper builds upon a broadening base of empirical research demonstrating that 
short sellers are informed traders who predict future returns (see e.g., Desai et al., 2002; 
                                                                                                                                                      
ask spreads, reflecting lower informational asymmetries across traders in the market. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) report 
that institutional investors improve the efficiency of security prices. 
2 In contrast with SEC’s assertion, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) show that this ban imposed significant costs on 
traders in terms of deteriorating liquidity and higher volatility, without any permanent effects on share valuations. 
3 See, e.g. Henry and Koski (2010). 
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Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009; Asquith, Pathak, and 
Ritter, 2005) and facilitate price discovery (see e.g., Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2012; Boehmer 
and Wu, 2013). The literature also shows that short sellers typically initiate short positions 
when they can infer low fundamental values from public sources. For example, short sellers 
might: (i) engage in forensic accounting, looking for high levels of accrual as evidence of 
hidden bad news (Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011), (ii) detect financial misconduct 
(Karpoff and Lou, 2010), (iii) target firms with poor earnings quality (Desai, Krishnamurthy 
and Venkataraman, 2006), or (iv) look for abnormally elevated price-earnings ratios 
(Dechow et. al, 2001). In some cases, short sellers have been shown to increase short 
positions just before announcements of unfavorable news affecting the underlying company 
(Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh, 2010). 
Closely related to our paper is the analysis in Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg 
(2012), who examine daily short selling flows over shorter, ten-day periods preceding news 
announcements. They find that the highest shorting volume in their sample occurs during 
the day of the news announcement rather than the preceding trading days. They conclude 
that short sellers’ returns are related to their ability to analyze, rather than predict, public 
news announcements, and that short sellers are highly skilled in interpreting public news 
announcements.  
Our paper highlights a different, but equally important skill set of professional short-
sellers:  the ability to predict, several months ahead, changes in firm fundamental values. 
Using a different experimental design from Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012), we 
show that the most heavily shorted stocks are followed by events associated with a decrease 
in firm fundamental value, which occur as late as twelve months into the future. 
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An implicit assumption in Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg’s (2012) study is that 
short sellers have short investment horizons that do not extend beyond two calendar weeks. 
While this can be true for some traders, casual observations of professional short sellers 
suggest that their investment horizon is much longer.  For example, James Chanos started to 
short Enron’s stock in October 2000, months before the company’s demise in 2001.  Other 
professional short sellers whose shorting strategies are based on “forensic accounting” (such 
as shorting firms with high accruals), typically adopt investment horizons ranging from 
several months to several years. In our analysis we allow for such longer horizons. Our 
results suggest that this methodological variation matters—over this longer period, short 
sellers do seem able to predict news announcements as well as changes in firm fundamental 
value. 
Our results are complementary to the findings in Englelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg 
(2012).  The fact that short sellers are able to predict changes in firm fundamentals several 
months into the future does not preclude them from also being able to interpret public news 
on the day of the news release.  Our paper, therefore, provides a more complete picture of 
the role played by short sellers in financial markets: we demonstrate that short sellers are not 
only short-term skilled information processors, but also generators of long-lived value-
relevant information about fundamental value.  The duration or “shelf life” of short seller’s 
information set could be as long as twelve months, significantly longer than previously 
documented in the literature. 
 Our results are supportive of Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1987) prediction that 
shorts are more informed in the presence of high shorting costs. Using various proxies for 
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short sale constraints, we find that short interest better predicts changes in firm 
fundamentals for stocks that are more difficult to short.   
Finally, our paper does not preclude alternative explanations of the negative relation 
between short interest and subsequent stock returns. Several empirical studies (see e.g.  
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005)) provide evidence consistent with Miller’s (1977) 
argument that short-sale constraints cause stock prices to be overvalued because investors 
with negative valuations cannot easily impact prices through trading.  These studies argue 
that stocks that are already heavily shorted are the most difficult to short.  Our paper shows 
that in addition to being a proxy for short sale constraints, the level of short interest (which 
shows positions already established by short sellers) is also informative about future 
changes in firm fundamental value, thus providing another transmission channel for the 
relation between short interest and future stock returns.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data 
sources, methodology, and variables used as proxies for firm fundamental information. We 
present empirical results in Section 3 regarding the informational content of short interest 
and its role on return predictability. Section 4 shows short interests’ return predictability 
vanishes after controlling for short’s informational content.  Section 5 presents robustness 
checks, and Section 6 concludes.   
2.  Data and methodology 
We used two different methods to assess the extent to which short interest predicts 
stock returns or changes in firm fundamentals.  First, we use monthly Fama-MacBeth 
regressions (Fama and French, 1992; Carhart, 1997), where we regress future stock returns 
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or changes in firm fundamentals on current short interest levels. To measure the economic 
significance of the results, we replicate the cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions after 
transforming all independent variables into decile ranks and then standardize these ranks to 
take values between zero and one. This transformation makes interpreting and comparing 
coefficients across variables more intuitive. We refer to these standardized regressions in the 
paper but tabulate the full results in the Internet Appendix to this paper. 
The second method is the calendar time portfolio procedure (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993). Each month, we rank stocks on the basis of short interest around its mid-month 
release date and assign them to decile portfolios. For each portfolio we compute subsequent 
changes in firm fundamentals, beginning with the calendar month after the short interest 
release.  Alternatively, we compute equally-weighted raw and abnormal returns for each 
portfolio.  Abnormal returns are computed as the intercept from the standard Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model: 
  pttttftmtftpt MOMHMLSMBrrrr   4321 )(    (1) 
2.1.  Level of short interest 
Our sample includes all common stocks listed on NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ 
(share code 10 or 11), between January 1988 and December 2010, that are included in the 
daily CRSP (Center for Research on Security Prices at the University of Chicago) data. 
We measure monthly levels of short interest, Short, using the levels of outstanding 
shares sold short on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. The number of shares outstanding and daily returns are obtained from CRSP. 
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2.2.  Proxy for shorting costs 
For our main tests we use institutional ownership (IO) as a measure of shorting costs 
because it is correlated with the supply of lendable shares (D’Avolio, 2002; Asquith, Pathak, 
and Ritter, 2005; Nagel, 2005).4  Data on institutional ownership are obtained from 13-F 
filings, available from Thomson Financial. We define institutional ownership, IO, as the 
sum of the holdings of all institutions for each stock in each quarter, divided by the number 
of shares outstanding. Stocks that have available return data but no reported institutional 
holdings are assumed to have zero institutional ownership.  
Institutional ownership is highly correlated with firm size. To address this problem, 
we orthogonalize it with respect to firm size (market value of equity). Since institutional 
ownership is bounded between 0 and 1, each quarter we group stocks into size deciles and 
run the following cross-sectional regression on a quarterly basis: 
   ܫ ௝ܱ௧ ൌ ∑ ߙ௜௧ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௧ଵ଴௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௝௧     (2) 
The explanatory variables are ten dummy variables that represent the ten size-based 
portfolios. For instance if firm j is in size decile 1 in quarter t, then Size1jt equals 1 and all 
other dummy variables equal zero. By construction, the intercept term is omitted from the 
regressions. We refer to the residuals from the quarterly cross-sectional regressions as 
residual institutional ownership (RIO).  RIO measures the deviation of a firm’s institutional 
ownership from the average institutional ownership within its size decile, in any given 
quarter.  
                                                 
4  In the robustness section we explore other proxies for short selling costs, such as market capitalization (SIZE), Amihud’s 
(2002) measure of illiquidity, share turnover, and analyst coverage.  The results are similar to those obtained with the 
main (IO) proxy. 
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2.3.  Stock returns and excess stock returns 
Our analysis uses both raw and abnormal stock returns.  To compute abnormal 
returns, we risk-adjust monthly returns (from CRSP) using size, momentum, and book-to-
market factors (Fama and French, 1992; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997). For 
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression method, we use monthly levels of size, momentum, 
and book-to-market for each stock in our data set. As before, size is the market value of 
equity obtained from CRSP. Book-to-market (B/M) is the ratio of book value of equity to 
market value of equity.  Book value is computed as in Fama and French (2002) and is 
measured at the most recent fiscal year-end that precedes the calculation date of market 
value by at least three months. We exclude firms with negative book values. The book value 
data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. The stock’s return momentum (R_MOM) is the 
cumulated raw return over the previous 12-month period. For the calendar time portfolio 
approach, we obtain from Kenneth French’s website at Dartmouth College the standard 
four-factor series: Rmt-Rft (the market excess return), SMB (the size factor return), HML (the 
book-to-market factor return), and MOM (the momentum factor return). 
2.4.  Proxies for future changes in firm fundamentals  
We examine three types of proxies for future changes in firm fundamentals: (i) 
future public news, (ii) earnings surprises, and (iii) changes in analyst forecasts. 
2.4.1.  Public news  
We obtain data on public news from RavenPack News Analytics, edition 3.0. 
RavenPack is an established provider of news analysis services. Since January 1, 2000, they 
collect corporate news items from all public sources, including Dow Jones, Barron’s, and 
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the Wall Street Journal, and classify each news item through content analysis according to 
its sentiment, relevance, topic, novelty, and market impact. The most relevant category for 
our paper is RavenPack’s Event Sentiment Score (ESS) variable. This variable measures 
whether a particular news item contains “good” or “bad” information about the underlying 
corporation. The ESS variable takes values from 0 to 100, with lower scores indicating bad 
news and higher scores indicating good news. A score of 50 is classified as neutral.5  
News items in RavenPack’s database are based on public news sources that 
sometimes mention more than one corporation. If the original news source mentions two or 
more corporations, RavenPack creates a separate news item for each corporation. However, 
RavenPack uses the “relevance” variable to differentiate between news items where the 
corporation is the main object of the original news source and news items where the name of 
the corporation is mentioned only tangentially. The relevance variable takes values from 0 
to 100. Throughout our analysis, we focus on news items where the sample firm’s name is 
the main object of the news story and eliminate all news items with a relevance score lower 
than 50. 
RavenPack assigns a unique corporate identifier to each stock in their database that 
we manually match to CRSP’s PERMNO security identifier. We successfully match 5,310 
securities from CRSP with RavenPack data. If, for any of these securities, RavenPack 
                                                 
5 RavenPack calculates sentiment scores according to an algorithm that is reportedly capable of “interpreting actual figures, 
estimates, ratings, revisions, magnitudes and recommendations disclosed in news stories.” RavenPack states that their 
algorithm can also “compare actual vs. estimated figures about earnings, revenues, and dividends – and produce an ESS 
score based on comparisons… (page 12).” Additional details on Event Sentiment Scores are contained in RP News 
Analytics – Dow Jones Edition – User Guide v.3.0, available at www.ravenpack.com. See Appendices B and D of that 
document for more details on ESS scores. 
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contains no news items in a given month, we assume no news about that particular stock 
that month. The remaining stocks are not covered by the RavenPack data. 
We construct two monthly news measures using RavenPack’s event sentiment score 
(ESS). The first measure, NEWS1, is constructed using a trinary classification of news 
content. For each event we assign a numerical value of either +1, 0, or –1, depending upon 
the level of the ESS score. Values of +1 are assigned to news items with positive sentiment 
(ESS score equal to 51 or higher). Values of 0 are assigned to news items having neutral 
sentiment (ESS score equal to 50), and values of –1 are assigned to news items with 
negative sentiment (ESS score equal to 49 or lower). If a stock does not have a news item in 
a particular month, we assume that this is equivalent to having neutral news content, and 
assign a value of zero to the trinary variable during that month.6  Each day, we average these 
trinary variables for all news events in RavenPack, resulting in a daily news content 
measure. NEWS1 is then computed as the monthly average over these daily news content 
measures. 
For our second measure, NEWS2, we use the actual ESS score assigned by 
RavenPack to the news event. We follow a similar averaging process as we did in 
constructing NEWS1, but instead of using trinary variables, we use the actual ESS values 
(ranging from 0 to 100). If a stock does not have an ESS score for a particular month, we 
treat that month as “neutral” and assign a value of 50 to NEWS2. 
                                                 
6 In additional untabulated robustness checks, we use different ESS cut-off values for the definition of “good,” “neutral,” 
and “bad” news. For example, instead of using the values of 51 and 49 as cutoffs for ESS scores, we use (i) 75 and 25, 
(ii) 66 and 33, and (iii) 80 and 20. The results are similar to those reported in the paper. We also repeat our analysis by 
excluding observations without identifiable news. Again, the results are similar. 
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We perform three additional modifications to enhance the reliability and integrity of 
both NEWS measures. First, we eliminate securities with prices below $5 at the end of the 
month for which short interest is measured. Second, to mitigate concerns about reverse 
causality between stock prices and news, we eliminate all news whose contents are 
categorized as “stock prices” or “order imbalances.” 7   Third, we recognize that bigger 
firms have more media coverage and are also more likely to work with investor relations 
companies to help frame the news items in a more positive light (Solomon, 2012). To 
account for these potential biases, we orthogonalize NEWS1 and NEWS2 with respect to 
firm size, following the procedure we use for institutional ownership. 
2.4.2.  Earnings surprises  
We construct earnings surprises from quarterly earnings announcements from 
COMPUSTAT. We use two measures of earnings surprises: standardized unexpected 
earnings (SUE) and cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcements 
(CAR).  
Following Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) and Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 






][            (3) 
where q is the quarter, EPSq are the most recent quarterly earnings per share, E[EPSq] are 
expected earnings per share, and σq is the standard deviation of unexpected earnings (EPSq – 
                                                 
7 The remaining 26 news categories are Acquisitions-Mergers, Analyst-Ratings, Assets, Bankruptcy, Corporate-
Responsibility, Credit, Credit Ratings, Dividend, Earnings, Equity-Actions (i.e., buybacks), Exploration, Index (i.e., 
index delisting), Industrial-Accident, Insider-Trading, Investor-Relation, Labor-Issues, Legal Issues, Marketing 
Partnerships, Price-Targets, Products-Services, Regulatory, Revenues, Taxes, Transportation.  
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E[EPSq]) over the preceding eight quarters. To estimate expected earnings we use a seasonal 
random walk model as in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996): 
4][  qq EPSEPSE            (4) 
The second measure of earnings surprises is the daily cumulative market-adjusted 
return around the earnings announcement date (CAR). CARs are computed as in Brown and 









mjiji rrCAR                (5) 
where rij is the stock i’s return on day j and rmj is the return on the equally-weighted CRSP 
market index on day j. Day j=0 is the earnings announcement date. 
2.4.3.  Changes in analyst forecasts  
We measure changes in analysts’ consensus earnings-per-share forecasts for the 
current fiscal year-end using data from FIRST CALL. We begin our sample period in 1990 
because FIRST CALL data are incomplete for previous years. We use the latest mean 
estimate available in a given month as our consensus forecast and measure the change in 
consensus estimate as the difference in mean estimates from the previous month (ΔEPSt = 
EPSt – EPSt-1). We normalize ΔEPSt in two ways. First, we divide it by the absolute value of 
the consensus forecast at the end of the previous month (|EPSt-1|). Alternatively, we divide it 
by the stock price at the end of the previous month (Pt-1). 
3.  Results 
We begin by replicating the negative predictive relation between the level of short 
interest and the cross-section of stock returns. We then examine the source of this 
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predictability by investigating the relation between short interest and future public news, 
earning surprises, and changes in analyst forecasts. 
3.1. Short interest and future returns  
Table 1 presents results on Short’s ability to predict stock returns, using calendar 
time portfolios. As expected, heavily shorted stocks significantly underperform lightly 
shorted stocks. The difference is 0.73% per month on an absolute basis, and by 0.95% per 
month on a risk-adjusted basis. For the most heavily shorted stocks (decile 10), the average 
relative short interest is 11.79% and the average monthly risk adjusted return is -0.57%  
(t=-3.23). These results corroborate previous studies, but do not inform on the cause of this 
relation. 
3.2.  Short interest and future fundamental news  
We now examine the relation between short interest and future public news. If 
higher levels of short interest contain negative information about firm fundamentals, stocks 
with high short interest should predict less favorable news. 
We begin with the calendar time portfolio methodology. The sample period for these 
tests is 2000-2010, corresponding to the availability of the RavenPack news dataset. The 
sample consists of 267,971 stock-month observations, 137,535 of which are from NASDAQ 
and 130,436 are from NYSE/AMEX. On average, our sample contains 2,042 stocks each 
month, 1,032 from NASDAQ and 1001 from NYSE/AMEX. Panel A of Table 2 presents 
key descriptive statistics for this sample. The average firm size is 4.92 billion dollars and 
exhibits considerable variation. On average, news content is neutral (zero, because we 
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orthogonalize news with respect to size, resulting in a mean-zero residual) and average 
relative short interest is 4.88%. 
We next examine the reliability of the news classification in the RavenPack data.   
If RavenPack categorization correctly captures the extent to which a news item surprises 
the market and conveys fundamental information about firms, we expect to find abnormal 
returns on news days compared to days without news or days with neutral news. We also 
expect these abnormal returns to be correlated with RavenPack’s sentiment (ESS) 
variable that carries information about news content.   
To test this prediction, we sort stocks each day into one of four groups (no news, 
bad news, neutral news, good news) based upon the daily averages of the NEWS1 and 
NEWS2 variables previously described.  We compute daily mean and median excess 
return values for each group. We then calculate time series averages of these cross 
sectional mean and median values.    
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2. The top line in the panel shows 
time series mean excess returns for stocks for various news content groups.   The mean 
daily excess return for stocks without RavenPack news is 6.9 basis points per day. The 
mean daily excess returns are 2.8 and -0.4 basis points per day for neutral news, using 
NEWS1 and NEWS, respectively.  For news event that are categorized as “bad” by 
RavenPack, the mean daily excess return is -141.8 basis points for NEWS1 and -142.3 
basis points for NEWS2.  For news events classified as “good” by RavenPack, the mean 
daily excess returns are 109.5 and 131.8 basis points for NEWS1 and NEWS2, 
respectively.  Similar results are found with median return values in the bottom line of 
Panel B.    
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The results in Panel B validate RavenPack’s classification of news content along 
the ESS variable. Excess returns are significantly positive for news items classified as 
“good” by the ESS variable, and significantly negative for news items classified as “bad.” 
These results also validate our methodological choice of assigning “no news content” to 
days when RavenPack news are absent: excess returns for “no news days” are close to 
zero and very similar to those measured on days when the ESS score is “neutral.”  
Overall, these finding confirm that the RavenPack classifications are proper and that they 
contain actual unexpected news.  
If short sellers are detectives who uncover unfavorable information, bad news should 
follow periods of heavy shorting. The results in Panel C of Table 2 readily confirm this 
conjecture. In a given month, the most heavily shorted stocks have the most negative public 
news the following month. At the other extreme, the least shorted stocks have the most 
positive public news the following month. The relation between short interest and future 
news is almost monotonically decreasing, for both the NEWS1 and NEWS2 measures. To 
assess the statistical significance of this relation we compute the difference in news content 
between stocks belonging to the top and bottom short interest decile. This difference, shown 
at the bottom of the panel, is strongly significant at the 1% level for both news measures. 
Panel C also shows the univariate relation between short interest and future stock 
returns, for the purpose of validating that the relation remains negative in this sample that is 
constrained by the availability of RavenPack news data. These sorts provide a first 
indication that short interest predicts both news and return.  
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that in the presence of non-trivial shorting 
costs, only investors who have strong negative information will choose to short. The 
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heightened cost of shorting will discourage less informed investors from shorting. Thus, the 
level of short interest should be more informative in the presence of high shorting costs.  We 
test this prediction using residual institutional ownership (RIO) as a proxy for shorting 
costs.8 Diamond and Verrecchia’s model implies that the relation between short interest and 
future public news is stronger for stocks with low RIO.  
We sort stocks independently into terciles based on the level of RIO and into 
quintiles based on the level of short interest. We compute next month’s average news 
content for each of the resulting 15 portfolios, and then average across all months. Panel D 
of Table 2 shows the conditional relation between short interest and future news, as a 
function of institutional ownership. As expected, the predictive ability of short interest 
(measured as the difference in news content between the top and bottom short interest 
quintiles) is a decreasing function of residual institutional ownership, and the conditional 
effect of institutional ownership is significant at better than the 1% level. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 2 provide evidence that short interest predicts 
public news. Consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), this result is stronger when 
short sale costs are higher.  Our results also suggest that both high and low levels of short 
interest carry informational content. High short levels predict negative news and low short 
levels predict positive news. Consistent with Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010), 
predictability is stronger for low short interest portfolios.  
An advantage of the calendar time portfolio method is that it can detect non-
monotonic relations between variables, but a possible shortcoming is that correlations with 
                                                 
8 Additional proxies for short sale constraints are examined in the robustness section of the paper.  
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excluded variables could result in spurious relations. To address this concern, we estimate 
Fama-MacBeth regressions that control for residual institutional ownership, lagged news 
content (news content measured in month t-1), size, book-to-market, and momentum and 
present the results in Table 3. Consistent with the portfolio sorts, short interest continues to 
predict subsequent public news content. The coefficient on short is significantly negative for 
both the NEWS1 and NEWS2 measures and the relation is stronger for lower levels of 
residual institutional ownership (the difference between these coefficients (not tabulated) is 
statistically significant at the 1% level). 
In the Appendix (Table A1) we report regressions based on standardized decile 
ranks. Using the same controls as in Table 2 Panel C, the difference between NEWS1 in the 
highest short interest decile and NEWS1 in the lowest short interest decile is -0.07 (the 
coefficient of Short in the first column of Table A1). This is similar in magnitude to the 
NEWS1 spread of -0.064 shown in Panel B of Table 2. In addition, consistent with the 
results in Panel C of Table 2, we find that that the coefficient of Short increases for lower 
values of residual institutional ownership. The results are similar for the NEWS2 measure. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 corroborate our previous findings that short 
interest predicts future news. Our results also suggest that short sellers are not merely taking 
positions based on current news; rather, they predict future news. Short interest contains 
information about future news content even after controlling for current news content. 
Therefore, we rule out the possibility that our results are simply driven by momentum in 
news items and short sellers’ ability to better process news items ex-post and take position 
accordingly. In fact, variation in current short interest predicts more variation in future news 
than it predicts variation in future returns.  
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3.3.  Short interest and future earnings surprises 
We now sharpen the focus of our analysis and look specifically at earnings 
announcements. Panel A of Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of portfolio sorts on 
earnings surprises. Specifically, we sort stocks into quintiles based on standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE). For each group, we report the average value of SUE, as well as 
the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding earning announcements. As 
expected, the two measures are highly correlated. Stocks with the most positive earnings 
surprises earn CARs of +1.55% during the five-day announcement window. At the other 
extreme, CARs are –1.65% for stocks with the most negative earnings surprises.  
In Panel B we sort stocks into quarterly short interest quintiles and compute the next 
quarter’s earnings surprises (SUE and CARs) for each quintile. These are then averaged 
intertemporally across all quarters. Short interest predicts future earnings surprises for both 
the CARs and SUE measures, and the predictability is statistically significant at the 1% level 
in both cases. These results corroborate previous evidence that short interest is informative 
about changes in firm fundamentals that are yet to be incorporated into stock prices. We 
explore the incremental role of shorting costs in Panels C and D.  The predictive power of 
Short for SUE (Panel C) and CAR (Panel D) is greater for lower levels of residual 
institutional ownership (RIO), suggesting that existing short positions are more informative 
when constraints are more binding. 
Table 5 presents cross-sectional regressions that examine short interest’s ability to 
predict future earnings surprises, using both the SUE and CAR measures of earnings 
surprises. Consistent with the portfolio sorts in Table 4, short interest predicts subsequent 
earnings surprises and its predictive power once again increases as short sale constraints 
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become more binding (low RIO).  The coefficient on Short is consistently negative and 
significant at the 1% level (except in one case, for CAR regressions with mid-level RIO) and 
becomes larger for stocks with low RIO. We also note that past return momentum and 
previous quarter’s earnings surprises have significant positive associations with future 
earnings surprises, a result consistent with Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996). Using 
standardized decile ranks (Table A2 in the Appendix), the coefficient of short interest in the 
CAR equation is -0.67 (t-value = -4.93). This implies that there is a 0.67% return difference 
around earnings announcements between stocks in the highest and lowest short interest 
deciles.  
Overall, the results obtained from the Fama-MacBeth regressions in Table 5 confirm 
that the level of short interest is informative about future earnings news in the cross-section 
of US stocks, especially when short selling is more constrained. Our results also suggest that 
short interest contains information about future earnings surprises, even after controlling for 
the previous quarter’s surprise and stock return momentum.  
3.4.  Short interest and future changes in analyst forecasts 
Changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts are often regarded as a proxy for changes in 
firm fundamentals. If short sellers are able to predict deteriorating fundamentals before 
analysts’ actions affect prices, we expect to find a significant relationship between short 
interest and future changes in consensus earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts, especially when 
shorting constraints are more binding. We test whether the level of short interest during the 
previous month, t-1, can predict the change in the mean EPS forecast between the end of 
month t-1 and the end of month t. We examine the relation between current levels of short 
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interest and two measures of future forecast changes. The first measure (ΔForecast1) is the 
one-month-ahead change in the consensus EPS forecast, normalized by the absolute value of 
mean EPS forecast at the end of month t-1 and reported in percentage form: ΔEPSt/|EPSt-1|. 
The second measure (ΔForecast2) is the same change in EPS, normalized by the share price 
at the end of month t-1: ΔEPSt/Pt-1. 
Table 6 presents the results obtained using the calendar time portfolio method. The 
analysis in this section is based on the sub-sample of stocks with at least one analyst forecast 
reported by First Call. In Panel A, stocks are sorted into quintiles based upon the level of 
short interest at month t-1. The first column in Panel A shows the mean level of short 
interest within each quintile. The next two columns verify that the predictability of stock 
returns is preserved in this particular sub-sample. The last two columns show that the level 
of short interest predicts future changes in analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts in the 
cross-section. Stocks in the highest short interest quintile are followed by a more negative 
change in analyst forecast when compared to those in the lowest quintile and this difference 
is statistically significant for both measures of earning forecast changes. For example, using 
the ΔForecast1 measure, which can be interpreted as percentage change in projected 
earnings, we find a difference of -5.31% (t-value = -4.95) between stocks in the top short 
interest quintile and those in the bottom quintile. Thus, short sellers appear to take positions 
on firms that are about to be revised downward by analysts based on their expectations of 
firms’ future earnings performance. We show in Panel B that the predictive power of short 
interest increases as shorting costs become significantly more severe. 
Fama-MacBeth regressions, presented in Table 7, provide a similar picture. The 
coefficient on Short is negative and significant in all panels and specifications. We obtain 
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similar results when independent variables are transformed into decile ranks and then 
standardized (see Table A3 in the Appendix).  For example, controlling for same firm 
characteristics as in Table 7, the difference in ΔForecast1 (percentage change in consensus 
EPS estimate) between the highest and lowest short interest decile is -4.3% (t-value =  
-6.62). Overall, the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that short selling predicts future analyst 
forecast revisions. 
3.5.  Longer-term results 
If short sellers are trading based on their superior ability to identify changes in 
fundamentals, the time pattern of their holdings should reflect this informational advantage. 
Specifically, we  expect short interest to increase ahead of bad news and decrease ahead of 
good news. To examine these time trading dynamics, we compare the size of short sellers’ 
relative positions around news events starting 12 months before and ending 12 months after 
each event. The relative positions are computed as the difference in short interest between 
“good-news” stocks and “bad-news” stocks. We define “good-news” and “bad-news” stocks 
based upon the subsequent occurrence of an event that alters the market’s perception of the 
stock’s fundamental value. 
Figure 1 depicts the inter-temporal evolution of short sellers’ relative position 
surrounding earnings surprises and analyst forecast revisions. We use the same two 
definitions of earnings surprises (SUE, CAR) and forecast revisions (ΔForecast1, 
ΔForecast2) as before. We first group stocks into quintiles based on these four variables. 
Sorting is done cross-sectionally each quarter (for earnings surprises) and each month (for 
earnings forecast revisions). We then calculate the difference between short interest for 
24 
 
stocks in the bottom quintile (bad news) and those in the top quintile (good news). 
Consistently, across the four measures we find that bad-news stocks gradually build up 
much higher short positions than good-news stocks. This process evolves gradually over the 
year before the news event and reverses over the year following the event. 
In Figure 2, we repeat the same analysis using the two public news measures from 
RavenPack, NEWS1 and NEWS2. Due to data availability, the sample period covered here is 
shorter, from 2000 to 2010.  However, the observed short interest pattern is very similar to 
that in Figure 1. Once again, short sellers gradually increase their positions in stocks that are 
about to experience bad news and then unwind these positions after the news become 
public. 
We next examine the “shelf life” or duration of the informational content of short 
interest.  We tabulate returns and news for future monthly holding periods, up to one year 
into the future. The results are presented in Table 8.  The predictive power of short interest 
for returns increases each month for the year following the sorting period.  For example, the 
difference in news content between highly shorted and least shorted stocks (using the 
NEWS1 measure) appears to be monotonically increasing with the event horizon.  At the 
12-month horizon, this difference in news content is -0.736 (t=-7.4).  We observe a similar 
monotonic pattern for stock returns, earnings, and analyst forecast revisions. 
Consistent with the graphical analysis in Figures 1 and 2, the results in Table 8 show 
that short sellers begin to adjust their positions up to one year before news events. Thus, 
short sellers’ knowledge is informative for returns and news occurring up to one year into 
the future. These results highlight the importance of looking at periods longer than a few 




4. Relation between return predictability and fundamental value predictability 
Thus far in the paper we have established that short interest predicts future changes 
in firm fundamental value.  This is a novel result in the literature, which complements the 
more established result that short interest predicts future stock returns.  In this section we 
seek to determine if these two results are related.  Specifically, we hypothesize that short 
interest’s return predictability established in prior research is caused, at least in part, by the 
informational content of short sale positions.  We use four different approaches to address 
this question empirically.  
4.1.  Fama-MacBeth regressions 
We begin with estimating Fama-MacBeth regressions that are similar to those 
reported in Tables 3, 5, and 7, with the following two exceptions: (i) the dependent variable 
is now excess returns, and (ii) contemporaneous changes in firm fundamentals are added as 
independent variables, alongside lagged short interest and controls for size, book-to-market, 
and 12-month return momentum.  Our focus is on measuring short interest’s explanatory 
power for returns, after controlling for short sellers’ information about news events. We run 
regressions with and without firm fundamental variables and compare the coefficient on 
short interest between the two specifications. If the coefficient on short interest loses 
importance when fundamental variables are included, it means that short interest’s ability to 
predict returns is explained (at least in part) by information about these firm fundamentals.  
The results are presented in Table 9. 
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Model 1 in Table 9 provides the baseline regression model, which does not include 
fundamental variables. The negative coefficient of short interest in this baseline regression 
(-0.049, t=-2.80) confirms that short interest significantly predicts the cross-section of stock 
returns in this sample.  When we add the three fundamental variables that short sellers can 
apparently predict (analyst forecasts revisions, earnings surprises, and news sentiment), the 
coefficient on short interest declines (in magnitude) to -0.035 (t=-1.86) in Model 2, and to  
-0.025 (t=-1.48) in Model 3.  In both models (2 and 3), the coefficient is substantially 
smaller in magnitude than the baseline coefficient, and is no longer significant. The 
difference between coefficients on short interest in Model 1 and 2 (3) is highly significant 
with a t-value of 4.67 (3.08). Comparing the magnitude of these coefficients, the results 
suggest that approximately half of short sellers’ ability to predict returns can be explained 
by their ability to predict future fundamentals. We obtain similar results in regressions based 
on decile ranks (reported in Table A4 of the Appendix). 
4.2. Forthcoming news and return predictability 
In our second approach, we use a more direct approach to determine if short sellers’ 
knowledge of forthcoming news is related to short interests’ return predictability.  If short 
sellers have no information about future news, their ability to predict returns should not be 
related to news flow. But if short sellers are primarily informed about future news, the 
relation between short interest and returns should be stronger when news are forthcoming, 
particularly if these news are negative.  
The test consists of regressing excess returns at time t on past short interest 
(measured at t-1) and current news content (measured at time t), accounting for the usual 
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risk control variables (size, book-to-market, and return momentum).  We construct the 
following three variables to measure the news content at time t :  
 News_Dummy is a news indicator that is equal to 1 if any news event occurs 
during month (t), following the month (t-1) when short interest is observed. 
 Neg_NEWS1_Dummy (and, alternatively, Neg_ NEWS2_Dummy) are indicator 
variables equal to 1 only if the respective values of NEWS1 or NEWS2 are 
negative (i.e., the news measures are below median).  
 Pos_NEWS1_Dummy (and, alternatively, Pos_NEWS2_Dummy) are indicator 
variables equal to 1 only if the respective values of NEWS1 or NEWS2 are 
positive (i.e., the news measures are above median). 
The results are presented in Table 10.  The first (leftmost) column includes the 
baseline regression without news dummies.  The negative coefficient on short confirms the 
well-known predictive relation between short interest and future returns.  The coefficient of 
short interest in the baseline regression is -0.045 (t=-2.26).  The next two columns include 
the news dummy variables, along with interactions between news and short.  The second 
(centermost) column uses the unsigned news dummy variable, while the third (rightmost) 
column uses the two signed news dummy variables (positive and negative).  We hypothesize 
that the presence of news, and particularly bad news, increases the predictive power of short 
interest for future returns. Thus, we expect to find a negative coefficient on the interactions 
between short and news dummies. 
In the second column of Table 10, the coefficient on short drops (in magnitude) from 
-0.045 to -0.027, and is no longer significant (t=-1.27).  By contrast, the coefficient on the 
interaction term (short*news_dummy) is negative, large in magnitude, and significant  
(-0.050, t=-3.98).  Taken together, these results imply that the relation between short interest 
and future returns is insignificant in the absence of forthcoming news, the coefficient of 
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short being -0.027.  However, in the presence of news, the sum of the coefficient on Short 
and the interaction term (-0.077) represent the total effect of short interest on returns.  This 
effect is large in magnitude and statistically significant.   
The third column of Table 10 documents an asymmetry between positive and 
negative news.  The predictive relation between short interest and stock returns appears to 
be driven exclusively by short’s ability to predict bad news, as evidenced by the negative 
and highly significant coefficient on the term interacting short interest with the bad news 
dummy (-0.092, t=-4.74).  
Regressions using standardized decile ranks provide some economic intuition about 
the magnitudes of the results (see Table A5 in the Appendix). In the baseline model without 
fundamental variables, the return difference between highest and lowest short interest decile 
is -82.7 basis points per month and significant at 5% level. In the news model, this same 
difference diverges to -55.8 basis points in the absence of forthcoming news, and to -126.3 
basis points when news are forthcoming.  The spread is even larger when forthcoming news 
are negative. Thus, the predictive power of short interest for future returns more than 
doubles in the presence of news.9 
4.3.  Explanatory power of short interest 
In our third approach, we measure short interest’s contribution to the explanatory 
power of the return regressions in Table 9. Specifically, we compute the percentage 
difference in average adjusted R2 between models with, and without short interest (not 
                                                 
9 We repeat the analysis in Table 10 using only analyst forecast changes as the news item. The results (unreported) are very 




tabulated). We find that adding short interest to the model increases adjusted R2 by 11.16% 
in Model 1 of Table 9. This implies that short interest explains an incremental 11.16% of the 
variation in stock returns when none of the fundamental news variables is included. In 
contrast, the contribution of short interest is only 5.25% and 1.58% in Models 2 and 3, 
respectively, when fundamental variables are also present in the regressions. The differences 
are significant at the 1% level. This means that the predictive power of short interest for 
future stock returns is strongly related to firms’ fundamental performance. After controlling 
for fundamental performance, the informational content of short interest for future stock 
returns is small because most of it is subsumed by future changes in fundamental 
performance. 
4.4.  Time series test 
For our fourth and final approach, we conduct a time-series test to determine if the 
ability of short interest to predict future returns is related to its ability to predict fundamental 
information (results are not tabulated).  We estimate two sets of monthly Fama-MacBeth 
regressions: in the first one short interest in month t-1 is regressed on excess stock return in 
month t, calculated as the difference between raw return and one-month T-bill rate. In the 
second regression short interest at t-1 is regressed on future news releases (NEWS2), 
earnings surprises (CAR), and analyst forecast revisions (ΔForecast2). We then run a time-
series regression between the monthly R2s obtained from the above two sets of cross-
sectional regressions using the R2s from the return regressions as the dependent variable. 




R2 (return regressions) = -0.0103×Intercept + 0.3397×R2 (fundamental regressions) 
             (t=-7.15)          (t=2.79) 
 
The R2 values from the return regression are significantly positively related to the R2 
values from the fundamental regressions. During months when short interest better predicts 
fundamental news, it also predicts returns better. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
 
We conduct four additional tests to assess the robustness of our results.   
5.1. Varying filters for NEWS1 and NEWS2. 
Our main public news definitions, NEWS1 and NEWS2, rely on RavenPack’s 
sentiment scores based on computerized content analysis. Although we show in Panel B of 
Table 2 that – from a market perspective – these news are unexpected and correctly signed, 
we repeat our analysis in Table 3 using more restrictive filters for defining NEWS1 and 
NEWS2.  Specifically, we require a minimum absolute return of 0.5 % (and alternatively 
1.0%) in excess of market return before we categorize a day as “bad news” or “good news.” 
With this new approach, news days associated with abnormal stock returns whose 
magnitude is lower than the new filter (0.5% or 1%) are categorized as neutral.   The results 
are shown in Table A6 of the Appendix.  Short interest continues to predict news and the 
magnitudes of the short coefficients remain similar to those reported in Table 3.  Our results 
are robust to this alternative classification of news.  
5.2. Persistence of public news 
If news are persistent over time, our results could be driven by short sellers’ ability 
to better interpret past news and take positions accordingly. Under this scenario, short 
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interest would simply reflect the information content of news that are already public.  To 
determine if our results are driven by news persistence we repeat our analysis in Table 3, 
controlling for past news up to six months earlier. The results (untabulated) show that short 
interest continues to predict future news even after controlling for past news over much 
longer time periods. 
5.3.  Alternative news source 
To assure that our news results are not specific to the RavenPack dataset, we use 
Chan’s (2003) news data that covers a random sample of approximately one-quarter of 
CRSP stocks during the period from 1980 to 2000. In Chan’s data, news items are collected 
from the Dow Jones Interactive Publications Library.  We compute market excess return for 
each news day and use only news with returns larger than 1% in absolute value. As with 
RavenPack news, we find that short interest continues to predict future news and that results 
are stronger for stocks that are more costly to short. As in previous tests, we continue to find 
that the predictive power of short interest significantly diminishes once we control for 
forthcoming news. Overall, the use of Chan’s news database demonstrates the robustness of 
our results to alternative news databases. 
5.4.  Different proxies for short sale constraints 
In the main results we use residual institutional ownership (RIO) as a proxy for 
shorting costs. We repeat our analysis using four alternative proxies: market capitalization 
(SIZE), Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity, share turnover, and analyst coverage. The 
results (untabulated) show that the relation between short interest and future news is 
stronger among stocks that are small, more illiquid, lightly traded, or followed by fewer 
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analysts. Overall, these results corroborate our earlier conclusion that short interest’s ability 
to predict future news is stronger in the presence of higher shorting costs, consistent with the 
predictions of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). 
6.  Conclusion 
Short interest predicts stock returns in the cross-section because short sellers are 
informed traders who generate value-relevant information. We show that short sellers 
correctly anticipate negative earnings surprises, bad public news, and downgrades in analyst 
earnings forecasts several months ahead. Their ability to predict future fundamental events 
appears to be the dominant driver of their ability to predict future returns. Shorts seem to be 
particularly well informed about stocks with low levels of institutional ownership, which are 
presumably harder to short. 
Our results suggest that short sellers’ advantage over other traders comes from their 
better ability to predict future material events that affect firm value, rather than shorter-
horizon trading strategies. This finding has important policy implications, because it raises 
questions about the source of this information about future events. Possibly short sellers run 
the same prediction models that analysts and news reporters do, but are just quicker or more 
effective in trading on this information compared to others. Alternatively, short sellers might 
trade on rumors or information leaks to which other traders do not have access.  Elucidating 
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Table 1. Short interest and future returns  
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period from 
January 1988 to December 2010. Each month, we sort stocks into short interest deciles based on 
Shortt-1, the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding. This table shows, for each decile, the time-
series means of short interest (Shortt-1), holding-period raw returns (Rett), and abnormal monthly 
returns (αt) computed as the intercept from a four-factor model including mktrf, smb, hml, and umd. 
All returns are measured over a one month horizon, during the month following portfolio formation. 
For each group, we show raw returns, abnormal returns, and level of short interest. T-statistics are 
shown in italics and are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance level at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 Shortt-1 Rett αt
Short1 (low) 0.009 1.19***  0.38***
 0.115 1.33***  0.37***
 0.375 1.32***  0.28***
 0.713 1.27***  0.19**
 1.114 1.16***  0.07
 1.614 0.99**  0.09
 2.241 1.07** -0.02
 3.162 0.97* -0.09
 4.893 0.69 -0.35***
Short10 (high) 11.788 0.46 -0.57***
Short10 – Short1  11.779*** -0.73***  -0.95***





Table 2. Short interest as predictor of public news: a portfolio approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period from 
January 2000 to December 2010. We also require that each stock be included in RavenPack news 
database. We report the time series averages of news content and return in month t based on short 
interest in month t-1. We infer news content from the sentiment score provided by Ravenpack. 
NEWS1 is the average content of news measure where news are classified as either negative, neutral, 
or positive. Then we assign numerical values of +1 to all positive news items, zero to all neutral 
items, and –1 to all negative news items and compute a monthly aggregate news measure by 
averaging the (signed) values of all news items that month. NEWS2 is the average of sentiment score 
of news in a month. Months with no news items are assigned an aggregate NEWS1 (NEWS2) 
measure equal to 0 (50). All news measures are orthogonalized with respect to firm size. Abnormal 
monthly returns (α) are computed as the intercept from a four-factor model including mktrf, smb, 
hml, and umd. All returns are measured over a one month horizon, during the month following 
portfolio formation. In Panel A we present time series averages of cross sectional descriptive 
statistics. In Panel B, we present time series averages of daily mean and median values of percentage 
daily excess returns for no news, positive, negative and neutral news stocks. In Panel C, we conduct 
a univariate sort on short interest (Shortt-1). In Panel D we conduct an independent double sort, first 
on residual institutional ownership (RIOt-1) and then on short interest (Shortt-1). Rett is monthly raw 
return; RIOt-1 is the residual from a quarterly regression of institutional ownership, IO, on firm size 
(Size). Sizet-1 is the market value of equity and defined as share price times the number of shares 
outstanding. Institutional ownership (IOt-1) is the percentage of shares owned by institutions as 
reported in 13F filings. T-statistics are shown in italics and are based on robust standard errors. *, **, 
and *** denote significance level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 
  Mean Median Std P10 P90 
SIZEt-1 4.92 0.76 19.65 0.11 8.99 
BMt-1 0.53 0.41 0.59 0.12 1.03 
R_MOMt-1 (%) 26.94 9.47 81.8 -32.8 93.7 
IOt-1 (%) 65.92 70.2 26.4 27.08 95.61 
NEWS1t 0 -0.07 0.43 -0.37 0.64 
NEWS2t 0 -1.64 9.21 -7.02 10.9 
RETt(%) 0.86 0.41 13.14 -13.5 15.46 
SHORTt-1 4.88 3.3 5.53 0.42 11.05 
 
Panel B: Average Daily Excess Returns of No News, Neutral, Bad and Good News Stocks 
 
News 1 News 2  
No News Bad Neutral Good  Bad Neutral Good  
Mean 0.069 -1.418 0.028 1.095 -1.423 -0.004 1.318














  Shortt-1 NEWS1t NEWS2t Rett αt 
Short1 (low)  0.15  0.031***  0.693***  1.5***   0.85*** 
 0.75  0.022***  0.317***  1.2***  0.49*** 
 1.39  0.011***  0.126***   1.13**  0.42*** 
 2.07  0.013***  0.183  1.04**  0.31**  
 2.87  0.007**   0.113  1.03*  0.29**  
 3.75  0.001  0.05  0.92*  0.19  
 4.82 -0.068**  -0128**   0.71  0.03 
 6.37 -0.015*** -0.237***  0.5  -0.11 
 8.98 -0.029*** -0.541***  0.39 -0.22 
Short10 (high)  17.6 -0.033*** -0.673***  0.19 -0.54*** 
Short10- Short1  17.45 -0.064 -1.366 -1.31 -1.39 













Short1t-1  0.027***  0.027***  0.019*** 0.008  1.24 
 -0.002  0.016***  0.017*** -0.15 -2.08 
 -0.011**   0.007**  0.015*** -0.026 -2.79 
 -0.029*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.024 -2.54 
Short5t-1 -0.059*** -0.035*** -0.014*** -0.045 -4.02 
Short1-Short5 -0.086 -0.062 -0.033 -0.53  





Short1t-1  0.56***  0.51***  0.263**   0.297  2.12 
  0.0   0.24***  0.187** -0.187 -1.46 
 -0.169*   0.153***  0.261*** -0.43 -2.27 
 -0.52*** -0.038 -0.062 -0.45 -2.36 
Short5t-1 -1.1*** -0.63*** -0.21*** -0.89 -3.58 
Short1-Short5 -1.66 -1.14 -0.476 -1.184  
t-value -7.09 -6.68 -3.25 -5.57  
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Table 3. Short interest as predictor of public news: A regression approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period from January 2000 to December 2010. We also require 
that each stock be included in RavenPack news database. The table shows monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions where the dependent variable is content 
of future monthly news items (NEWS). We report the time series averages of month t news content and return based on short interest in month t-1. We 
infer news content from the sentiment score provided by Ravenpack. NEWS1 is the average content of news measure where news are classified as either 
negative, neutral, or positive. Then we assign numerical values of +1 to all positive news items, zero to all neutral items, and –1 to all negative news 
items and compute monthly aggregate news measure by averaging the (signed) values of all news items that month. NEWS2 is the average of sentiment 
score of news in a month. Months with no news items are assigned an aggregate NEWS1 (NEWS2) measure equal to 0 (50). All news measures are 
orthogonalized with respect to firm size. The independent variables are Short (the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding), RIO (residual institutional 
ownership , where institutional ownership is the percentage of shares owned by institutions as reported in 13F filings and residuals are obtained from 
quarterly regressions of institutional ownership on size), Size (the natural logarithm of the market value of equity), BM (the natural logarithm of the ratio 
between book value of equity and the market value of equity calculated at least three months before the short interest data), R_MOM (the mean stock 
return performance over the previous 12 months) and Newst-1 (news content measured in month t-1). The table reports time-series averages of the 
coefficient estimates. T-statistics are shown in italics below each coefficient and are based on robust standard errors. 
  All Low RIO Med RIO High RIO All Low RIO Med RIO High RIO 
  NEWS1t NEWS1t NEWS1t NEWS1t NEWS2t NEWS2t NEWS2t NEWS2t 
Interceptt-1 0.002 0.024 0.022 -0.009 -0.067 0.512 0.497 -0.638
0.26 1.66 1.33 -0.37 -0.33 1.74 1.47 -1.28
Shortt-1 -0.309 -0.552 -0.416 -0.177 -5.633 -10.854 -7.485 -2.861
-9.38 -10.18 -7.15 -6.46 -8.10 -9.06 -6.96 -4.65
Sizet-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.023 -0.030 0.003
0.44 -0.32 -0.35 -0.43 -0.31 -1.02 -1.54 0.09
BMt-1 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.017 -0.311 -0.199 -0.299 -0.464
-2.68 -1.17 -2.69 -5.11 -3.76 -2.07 -3.74 -6.44
R_MOMt-1 0.051 0.040 0.060 0.070 1.448 1.162 1.711 1.966
8.67 7.62 7.30 8.83 8.87 8.54 7.79 8.62
RIOt-1 0.048 0.038 0.026 0.058 1.025 0.802 0.350 1.119
6.50 3.16 0.80 4.09 7.23 3.11 0.51 4.01
Newst-1 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.008 -0.012
0.67 0.08 0.52 0.22 -1.36 0.11 -1.76 -2.77




Table 4. Short interest as predictor of earnings surprises: A portfolio approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period from January 1988 
to December 2010. In Panel A, we sort stocks into quintiles based on standardized unexpected earnings, (SUE), 
defined as the change in earnings per share from quarter q-4 to quarter q divided by the standard deviation of 
unexpected earnings over the last eight quarters. We report time-series means of SUEq and announcement 
abnormal returns, CARq, defined as the average (across firms) of the daily market-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return (in percent) during the [-2, +2] window around the earnings announcement date. In Panel B, we sort on 
quarter q-1 short interest (Shortq-1) and report the time-series average of one quarter ahead earnings surprises, 
SUEq and CARq. Short is the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding. In Panels C and D we conduct an 
independent double sort, first on quarter q-1 residual institutional ownership (RIO) and then on quarter q-1 short 
interest (Short). Panel C reports the corresponding CARq for the next-quarter earnings announcement, and Panel 
D reports the average SUEq. RIOq-1 is the residual from a quarterly regression of institutional ownership, IO on 
firm size (Size). Size is the market value of equity and defined as share price times the number of shares 
outstanding. Institutional ownership (IO) is the percentage of shares owned by institutions as reported in 13F 
filings. T-statistics are shown in italics and are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance 
level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on earnings surprises 
 SUE1q 
(low) 
   SUE5q 
(high) 
 SUE5 – SUE1 t-value 
SUEq -1.98 -0.22 0.13 0.57 2.11  4.09*** 36.22 
CARq -1.65 -0.95 0.25 1.05 1.55  3.20*** 23.21 
 
 
Panel B: Future earnings surprises as a function of current short interest 
 Shortq-1 SUEq CARq
Short 1 (low) 0.086 0.115 0.310 
 0.651 0.186 0.095 
 1.545 0.192 0.007 
 2.903 0.132 0.033 
Short 5 (high) 8.556 0.020 -0.126 
Short 5 – Short 1      8.470***     -0.095***     -0.436***










Panel C: Future earnings-event CARs a function of current short interest and residual institutional 
ownership 






RIO1 – RIO3 t-value 
Shortq-1 1  0.11  0.49 0.37 -0.26** -2.27 
  -0.14  0.16 0.25 -0.39*** -2.85 
  -0.20  0.04 0.13 -0.33** -2.33 
 -0.28  0.09 0.23 -0.51*** -3.71 
Shortq-1 5 -0.58 -0.03 0.03 -0.61*** -3.22 
Short1 - Short5  0.69***  0.52*** 0.34***   






Panel D: Future SUE as a function of current short interest and residual institutional ownership 




  RIOq-1 3 
(high) 
RIO1 – RIO3 t-value 
Shortq-1 1  0.17  0.08  0.04  0.13***   3.53 
  0.25  0.18  0.12  0.13***   4.36 
  0.20  0.21  0.15  0.05   1.65 
  0.12  0.17  0.11  0.01   0.07 
Shortq-1 5 -0.11  0.04  0.07    -0.18*** -4.57 
1 – 5  0.28***  0.04 -0.03*   









Table 5. Short interest as predictor of earnings surprises: A regression approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period from January 1988 to December 2010. We estimate 
quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions using earnings surprises as the dependent variable. We split the data every quarter based on residual 
institutional ownership (RIO) and run separate regressions for the top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of the data. Earnings surprises are 
measured using either SUE or CAR. SUEq is the change in quarterly earnings per share from quarter q-4 to quarter q, divided by the standard 
deviation of unexpected earnings over the last eight quarters. CARq is the daily market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (in percent) during the 
[-2, +2] window around the earnings announcement date. The independent variables are Shortq-1 (the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding), 
RIOq-1 (the residual institutional ownership as defined in Table 3), Sizeq-1 (the natural logarithm of the market value of equity), BMq-1 (the natural 
logarithm of the ratio between book value of equity and the market value of equity calculated at least three months before the short interest data), 
and R_MOMq-1 (the mean stock return performance over the previous 12 months), E_MOMq-1 (previous quarter’s earnings surprise). The table 
reports time-series averages of the coefficient estimates. T-statistics are shown in italics below each coefficient and are based on robust standard 
errors.  
 
 All Low RIOq-1 Med RIOq-1 High RIOq-1 All Low RIOq-1 Med RIOq-1 High RIOq-1
 SUEq SUEq SUEq SUEq CARq CARq CARq CARq
Interceptq-1 -0.592 -0.428 -0.509 -0.871 0.229 0.189 0.481 0.304
 -9.83 -4.37 7.63 -9.19 1.01 0.62 1.84 0.71
Shortq-1 -0.016 -0.031 -0.016 -0.010 -0.045 -0.079 -0.028 -0.032
 -5.87 -6.50 -4.59 -3.40 -4.12 -4.95 -1.14 -2.97
Sizeq-1 0.045 0.035 0.039 0.061 -0.004 0.016 -0.018 -0.014
 7.48 4.20 5.79 8.85 -0.21 0.70 -0.84 -0.38
BMq-1 -0.105 -0.110 -0.109 -0.099 0.152 0.225 0.192 0.005
 -6.29 -5.04 -6.20 -5.08 3.20 4.06 2.85 0.08
R_MOMq-1 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001
 9.18 6.65 9.19 10.94 0.37 1.10 -0.51 0.67
RIOq-1 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.008 0.014 0.018 0.001
 1.11 0.37 -0.44 3.36 4.37 3.89 3.70 0.20
E_MOMq-1 0.300 0.304 0.303 0.285 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.011
 25.33 21.67 20.95 21.83 1.55 1.56 0.83 1.93




Table 6. Short interest as predictor of changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts:  
A portfolio approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq that are available in the First Call 
database with at least one analyst following during the period from January 1990 to December 2010. Short is the 
ratio of short interest to shares outstanding in percentage terms. Ret is the one-month ahead raw return, and IO is 
the percentage of shares owned by institutions as reported in 13F filings. ΔEPSt is the one-month-ahead change in 
the consensus earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast of analysts in cents. ΔForecast1 is the percentage monthly 
change in the consensus EPS forecast measured as ΔEPSt/|EPSt-1|. ΔForecast2 is the monthly change in consensus 
EPS forecast normalized by share price measured as ΔEPSt/Pt-1. In Panel A, we sort stocks based on short interest 
(Short), and report future firm performance and change in analysts’ earnings per share forecasts (ΔForecast1 and 
ΔForecast2) for the current fiscal year-end. In Panel B and C, each month, we sort stocks first on residual 
institutional ownership (RIO) and then on short interest (Short). We then report the one-month ahead average 
change in analysts’ earnings per share forecasts (ΔForecast1 and ΔForecast2) for the current fiscal year-end. T-
statistics are shown in italics and are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance level at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Future performance as a function of current short interest 
 Shortt-1 Rett   αt ΔForecast1 ΔForecast2
Short 1 0.40 1.44  0.33** -4.38  -0.25
 1.22 1.15  0.03 -3.85  -0.21
 2.25 1.13 -0.03 -4.51  -0.20
 3.88 0.98 -0.14 -8.17  -0.44
Short 5 10.17 0.52 -0.62*** -9.69  -0.46
5 – 1 9.77 -0.92 -0.95 -5.31  -0.21 
t-value 19.18 -3.50 -5.09 -4.95  -1.98 
 
Panel B: Future changes in analysts’ EPS forecasts as a function of current short interest and 
residual institutional ownership 






RIO1 – RIO3 t-value 
 Shortt-1 1 -5.52 -3.40  -7.07   1.55  1.21  
  -3.28 -2.19  -6.15   2.88***  3.41  
ΔForecast1  -3.76 -5.16  -5.35   1.59*  1.85  
  -8.77 -5.89  -9.12   0.35  0.13 
 Shortt-1 5 -12.95 -9.66  -7.40  -5.55*** -3.45 
 Short1 - Short5  7.43***  6.26***   0.33   
 t-value  4.28  4.64   0.28   
 Shortt-1 1 -0.29 -0.36  -0.33   0.04   0.54  
  -0.24 -0.15  -0.22  -0.02 -0.44  
ΔForecast2  -0.27 -0.24  -0.16  -0.11 -1.05  
  -0.70 -0.43  -0.25  -0.45 -1.10 
 Shortt-1 5 -0.82 -0.36  -0.32  -0.50*** -2.96 
 Short1 – Short5  0.53***  0.00  -0.01   




Table 7. Short interest as predictor of changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts: A regression approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period from January 1990 to December 2010. We estimate 
monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions using future changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts as the dependent variable. We split the data every month 
based on residual institutional ownership (RIO) and run separate regressions for the top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of the data. Future 
changes in earnings forecasts are measured as the one-month-ahead change in consensus analyst earnings forecasts. ΔEPSt is the one-month-ahead 
change in the consensus EPS forecast in cents. ΔForecast1 is measured as ΔEPSt/|EPSt-1| reported in percentage form. ΔForecast2 is measured as 
ΔEPSt/Pt-1.The independent variables are Short (the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding), RIO (the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions as reported in 13F filings), Size (the natural logarithm of the market value of equity), BM (the natural logarithm of the ratio between 
book value of equity and the market value of equity calculated at least three months before the short interest data), E_MOM (the mean earnings 
forecast revisions over the previous 12 months), and R_MOM (the mean stock return performance over the previous 12 months). Table reports 
time-series averages of the coefficient estimates. T-statistics are shown in italics below each coefficient and are based on robust standard errors.  
 
 All Low RIOt-1 Med RIOt-1 High RIOt-1 All Low RIOt-1 Med RIOt-1 High RIOt-1
 ΔForecast1 ΔForecast1 ΔForecast1 ΔForecast1 ΔForecast2 ΔForecast2 ΔForecast2 ΔForecast2
Interceptt-1 -41.396 -32.941 -13.802 -50.903 -0.755 -0.380 -1.146 -1.087
 -9.23 -5.68 -0.52 -8.93 -5.55 -2.02 0.62 -7.80
Shortt-1 -0.372 -0.538 -0.383 -0.305 -0.022 -0.033 -0.013 -0.008
 -5.48 -2.36 -2.96 -3.31 -4.05 -2.88 -3.38 -2.24
Sizet-1 2.527 2.022 0.708 3.128 0.045 0.026 -0.081 0.070
 7.61 5.67 0.40 7.40 5.34 2.19 -0.65 8.71
BMt-1 -0.889 0.651 -0.314 -2.983 -0.026 -0.023 -0.008 -0.024
 -1.84 1.16 -0.43 -3.65 -1.97 -1.27 -0.39 -1.05
R_MOMt-1 0.091 0.085 0.083 0.089 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
 8.30 6.91 7.30 8.41 3.96 1.72 1.88 2.37
RIOt-1 0.001 -0.039 0.053 0.029 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001
 0.07 -1.49 0.92 0.37 2.61 1.13 1.86 0.70
E_MOMt-1 0.122 0.213 0.203 0.188 0.578 0.683 0.652 0.667
 6.08 3.20 3.97 5.67 5.11 5.27 4.30 6.54




Table 8. Short interest as predictor of future fundamental information: A long-term portfolio approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. NEWS data covers the period from January 2000 to December 2010 
for stocks included in the RavenPack database; whereas analyst forecast and earnings surprise data covers the period from January 1990 to 
December 2010. Firms are first sorted into deciles based on short interest each month. Sorts are done each quarter for earnings surprise variables. 
We then show the average difference in percentage return and fundamental performance between highest and lowest short interest portfolios for 
holding periods up to 12 months. We infer news content from the sentiment score provided by RavenPack. NEWS1 is the average content of news 
measure where news are classified as either negative, neutral, or positive .Then we assign numerical values of +1 to all positive news items, zero 
to all neutral items, and –1 to all negative news items and compute a monthly aggregate news measure by averaging the (signed) values of all news 
items that month. NEWS2 is the average of sentiment score of news. Months with no news items are assigned an aggregate NEWS1 (NEWS2) 
measure equal to 0 (50). All news measures are orthogonalized with respect to firm size. ΔForecast1 is the percentage change in the consensus 
analyst EPS forecast. ΔForecast2 is the change in consensus EPS forecast normalized by share price. Earnings surprises are measured using either 
SUE or CAR. SUEq is the change in quarterly earnings per share from quarter q-4 to quarter q, divided by the standard deviation of unexpected 
earnings over the last eight quarters. CARq is the daily market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (in percent) during the [-2, +2] window around 
the earnings announcement date. T-statistics are shown in italics below each coefficient and are based on robust standard errors. 
 
 
  Holding Period in Months 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Return -1.313 -2.798 -4.149 -5.492 -6.629 -7.869 -8.954 -9.963 -10.986 -11.967 -12.835 -13.807 
t value -2.76 -3.09 -3.15 -3.18 -3.18 -3.22 -3.33 -3.41 -3.37 -3.37 -3.34 -3.34 
NEWS1 -0.065 -0.13 -0.197 -0.26 -0.324 -0.387 -0.446 -0.505 -0.565 -0.621 -0.677 -0.736 
t value -6.76 -6.46 -6.64 -6.7 -6.78 -6.71 -6.71 -6.76 -6.84 -6.95 -7.18 -7.4 
NEWS2 -1.265 -2.558 -3.887 -5.087 -6.338 -7.545 -8.67 -9.786 -10.902 -11.935 -12.993 -14.056 
t value -6.55 -6.11 -6.22 -6.24 -6.32 -6.25 -6.25 -6.31 -6.37 -6.47 -6.67 -6.89 
∆Forecast 1 -5.35 -8.94 -11.2 -16.12 -21.27 -26.22 -30.57 -34.01 -37.09 -40.15 -42.39 -44.13 
t value -3.86 -4.14 -4.23 -4.06 -4.55 -4.62 -5.04 -5.13 -5.28 -5.37 -5.55 -5.33 
∆Forecast 2 -0.219 -0.631 -0.905 -1.2 -1.397 -1.692 -1.867 -2.058 -2.268 -2.381 -2.455 -2.484 
t value -2.37 -2.63 -3.15 -3.21 -3.32 -3.15 -3.25 -3.61 -3.84 -4.05 -4.19 -4.25 
SUE -0.091 -0.157 -0.192 -0.195 
t value -2.39 -2.2 -1.87 -1.49 
CAR -0.641 -1.151 -1.503 -1.714 
t value     -3.66   -3.33    -3.15   -3.19 
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Table 9. Short interest as predictor of future returns and the role of fundamentals: A regression approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period from January 2000 to December 2010. We estimate 
monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions using excess stock return in month t, calculated as the difference between raw return and one-month T-bill 
rate, as the dependent variable. ΔForecast1 is the percentage change in the consensus analyst EPS forecast in month t. ΔForecast2 is the monthly 
change in consensus EPS forecast normalized by share price. Earnings surprises are measured using either SUE or CAR. SUEt is the change in 
quarterly earnings per share from quarter q-4 to quarter q, divided by the standard deviation of unexpected earnings over the last eight quarters. 
CARt is the daily market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (in percent) during the [-2, +2] window around the earnings announcement date. 
NEWS1t is the average content of news measure where news are classified as either negative, neutral, or positive. Then, we assign numerical 
values of +1 to all positive news items, zero to all neutral items, and –1 to all negative news items and compute a monthly aggregate news measure 
by averaging the (signed) values of all news items that month. NEWS2 is the average of sentiment score of news in month t provided by 
RavenPack. Months with no news items are assigned an aggregate NEWS1 (NEWS2) measure equal to 0 (50). The independent variables are  
Shortt-1 (the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding), Sizet-1 (the natural logarithm of the market value of equity), BMt-1 (the natural logarithm 
of the ratio between book value of equity and the market value of equity calculated at least three months before the short interest data) and 
R_MOMt-1 (the mean stock return performance over the previous 12 months). The contribution of short interest (CONTR) is calculated as the 
percentage difference in average adjusted R2 between the models with and without short interest in the regressions. The table reports time-series 
averages of the coefficient estimates. T-statistics are shown in italics below each coefficient and are based on robust standard errors.  
 
 
Intt-1 Short t-1 ΔForecast1t ΔForecast2t SUEt CARt NEWS1t NEWS2t Size t-1 BM t-1 R_MOM t-1 Adj. R2 CONTR 
Model 1 4.353 -0.049 -0.239 0.223 -0.004 4.84% 11.16% 
2.33 -2.8 -2.32 1.37 -0.79  
Model 2 5.226 -0.035 0.019 0.74 1.416 -0.301 0.303 -0.01 7.81% 5.25% 
2.8 -1.86 9.62 9.51 16.2 -2.63 1.92 -1.7  
Model 3 4.122 -0.025 0.186 4.572 0.094 -0.232 0.201 -0.006 24.01% 1.58% 




Table 10. Short interest as a predictor of future returns and the role of public news 
releases: A regression approach 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period 
from January 2000 to December 2010. We also require that each stock be included in the 
RavenPack news database. The table shows monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions using excess stock 
returns over month t, calculated as the difference between raw return and one-month T-bill rate, as 
the dependent variable. We infer news content from the sentiment score provided by RavenPack. 
NEWS1 is the average content of news measure in month t where news are classified as either 
negative, neutral, or positive. We assign numerical values of +1 to all positive news items, zero to 
all neutral items, and –1 to all negative news items and compute a monthly aggregate news measure 
by averaging the (signed) values of all news items that month. Months with no news items are 
assigned an aggregate NEWS1 measure equal to 0. All news measures are orthogonalized with 
respect to firm size. News_Dummy is a variable that equals to 1 if a news event occurs in month t 
and 0 otherwise. Neg_NEWS1_Dummy (Pos_NEWS1_Dummy) is a variable that equals to 1 if a 
news event occurs in month t and the NEWS1 content is below (above) median and 0 otherwise. 
Other independent variables are defined in Table 3. The table reports time-series averages of the 
coefficient estimates. T-statistics are shown in italics below each coefficient and are based on 
robust standard errors. 
 
Dependent Variable: Excess Rett  
Interceptt-1 0.022 0.022 0.022  
1.59 1.63 1.64  
Short t-1 -0.045 -0.027 -0.027  
-2.26 -1.27 -1.27  
Shortt-1*News_Dummyt -0.050  
-3.98  
News_Dummyt 0.2  
1.33  
Neg_ NEWS1_Dummyt -1.8  
-8.56  
Pos_ NEWS1_Dummyt 1.3  
9.77  
Short t-1* Neg_ NEWS1_Dummyt -0.092  
-4.74  
Short t-1* Pos_ NEWS1_Dummyt 0.006  
0.43  
Size t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
-0.95 -1.14 -1.13  
BM t-1 0.32 0.317 0.366  
2.05 2.04 2.44  
R_MOM t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003  
  -0.49 -0.50 -0.93  





Figure 1. Short interest around earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings 
forecast changes 
 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period 
from January 1988 to December 2010. Each month, we sort stocks into quintiles based on four 
different events and measure the difference in short interest (in percentage) between good news and 
bad news portfolios starting from 12 months before the event until 12 months after the event. The 
four different events are defined as follows: (1) standardized unexpected earnings, (SUE), defined 
as the change in earnings per share from quarter q-4 to quarter q divided by the standard deviation 
of unexpected earnings over the last eight quarters, (2) CARs, defined as the average (across firms) 
of the daily market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (in percent) during the [-2, +2] window 
around an earnings announcement date, (3) percentage monthly change in the consensus EPS 
forecast of analysts defined as ΔEPSt/|EPSt-1|,and (4) monthly change in consensus EPS forecast of 






































Figure 2. Short interest around public news 
 
The sample contains common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq during the period 
from January 2000 to December 2010. We also require that each stock be included in the 
RavenPack news database. Each month, we sort stocks into deciles based on two different new 
categories and measure the difference in short interest between good news and bad news portfolios 
starting from 12 months before the event until 12 months after the event. The figure shows the time 
series averages of the differences. We infer news content from the sentiment score provided by 
RavenPack. NEWS1 is the average content of news measure where news are classified as either 
negative, neutral, or positive. We assign numerical values of +1 to all positive news items, zero to 
all neutral items, and –1 to all negative news items, and compute a monthly aggregate news 
measure by averaging the (signed) values of all news items that month. NEWS2 is the average of 
sentiment score of news in a month. Months with no news items are assigned an aggregate NEWS1 
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